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IV. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) . 
The "Order, Ruling and Judgment" appealed from was 
entered on March 8, 1990. The appellants' Notice of Appeal was 
filed on April 3, 1990. 
V. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Are the subdividers' claims barred by a statute 
of limitations. Sub issues are: 
a) Were the subdividers required to file a notice 
of claim within 90 days after they paid the fees 
pursuant to a void ordinance? 
b) If so, did they file a notice of claim? 
c) Which, if any, statute of limitations applies 
when a subdivider challenges a void ordinance or 
assessment? 
d) Did the trial court err in failing to toll any 
applicable statute of limitations until the 
Utah Supreme Court issued a final decision on 
the issue of class certification in related 
litigation? 
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e) Did the lower court err in failing to toll any 
applicable statute of limitations under the 
doctrine of equitable tolling? 
2. Are the subdividers entitled to a judgment for a 
a refund. Sub issues are: 
a) Was West Jordan collaterally estopped by the 
previous Call v. West Jordan litigation from 
raising the affirmative defenses of mistake, 
estoppel, waiver, laches and unjust enrichment? 
b) Are the affirmative defenses of mistake, 
estoppel, waiver, laches and unjust enrichment 
unavailable to a municipality in an action for 
recovery of money paid under a void ordinance? 
Each of the issues presented for review is a question 
of law with no deference given to the trial court. 
Authority for the notice of claim and statute of 
limitations issue follows: Beck v. Dutchman Coalition Mines 
Co., 269 P.2d 867 (Utah 1954); Ponderosa One Ltd. Partnership 
v. Salt Lake City Suburban Sanitary District, 738 P.2d 633 
(Utah 1987); El Rancho Enterprises, Inc. v. Murray City Corp., 
565 P.2d 778 (Utah 1977); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 
U.S. 345 (1983). 
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Supporting authority on the collateral estoppel issue 
is Nielson v. Droubay, 652 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah 1982). 
Supporting authority showing whether West Jordan's 
affirmative defenses are meritless is a question of law is: El 
Rancho, supra; Port of Peninsula v. Bendiksen, 429 P.2d 859, 
861 (Wash. 1967); Parente v. Day, 241 N.E.2d 280, 283 (Ohio 
App. 1968). 
VI. 
DETERMINATIVE, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The determinative, constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, rule and regulations are set forth in the 
appendix to this brief. They are: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25; 
Utah Const, art. I § 11; 
Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
VII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Third 
Judicial District Court, of Salt Lake County, Utah. The 
judgment granted the City of West Jordan's ("West Jordan") 
Partial Motion for Summary Judgment on its statute of 
limitations defense and denied appellants' Cross Motion for 
3 
Summary Judgment on West Jordan's statute of limitations 
defense and other City affirmative defenses. The trial court's 
ruling dismissed appellants' complaint against West Jordan. 
VIII. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
West Jordan adopted City Ordinance No. 33 requiring 
subdividers to dedicate 7% of their land to the City or pay an 
equivalent impact fee as a condition for subdivision approval. 
(R. 2, 3, 9-11, 143, 144, 193.) 
Thereafter, the appellants (hereinafter "sub-
dividers") paid money to West Jordan, under the ordinance, as 
follows: 
Date of Dedication 
Subdivider Property or Money Paid or Payment 
American Tierra Corp. $45,844.00 August 1978 
Arnold Development, Co. 64,150.00 1978 
Brighton Builders, Inc. 13,421.25 August. 1978 
R & D Engineers, Inc. 13,235.00 June 1975 
(R. 2-3, 9-11, 131, 143-144.) 
Subsequently, Robert J. DeBry, attorney at law, sent 
a letter to the West Jordan Mayor and City Council on behalf of 
subdividers, John Call, Clark Jenkins and "all others 
similarly situated" who had been required to pay money or 
dedicate property under the Ordinance. The letter was sent 
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pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-11, the predecessor to Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-2 et seq. The Notice of Claim demanded that 
all the land and cash be returned to the subdividers. (R. 
207, 208.) The City of West Jordan received the letter but 
refused to return the cash and property to the subdividers. 
On or about February 1, 1978, DeBry filed a class 
action Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court against 
the City for the return of the impact fees. The action was 
entitled "John Call and Clark Jenkins v. City of West Jordan" 
filed in the Third Judicial District Court, Civil No. C78-829. 
(R. 211-217.) The Complaint designated the class as "all 
persons, partnerships, businesses, and corporations who have or 
will be required to either dedicate to West Jordan seven 
percent (7%) of the land area of the proposed subdivisions or 
pay the equivalent value in cash as required by Ordinance No. 
33 as amended." (R. 211-217.) A copy of the ordinance is 
attached in the appendix. 
After three appeals of lower court rulings, the Utah 
Supreme Court in Call v. West Jordan, 727 P. 2d 180 (Utah 1986) 
("Call III") ruled in favor of subdividers Call and Jenkins and 
against West Jordan. This Court declared the West Jordan 
ordinance void ab initio. However, in Call III, the Utah 
Supreme Court upheld that part of the trial court's ruling 
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which denied class action status. Call III, at 183. 
The Call III decision was issued on July 23, 1986. 
Rehearing on the class action issue was denied on October 29, 
1986. Call III, at 180. 
Upon remand, West Jordan was allowed to amend its 
answer to set forth the affirmative defenses of mistake, 
estoppel, waiver, laches and unjust enrichment. (R. 156-169, 
172-178.) 
Subsequently, the trial court awarded Call and 
Jenkins a judgment for a refund of the impact fees plus 
interest. The judgment was entered on November 5, 1987. (R. 
179-183.) 
The Complaints of American Tierra Corp., Arnold 
Development Co., Covecrest Properties and Brighton Builders, 
Inc. were filed on November 24, 1987. R & D Engineers, Inc. 
filed its Complaint on July 18, 1988. Each Complaint alleges 
that the impact fee ordinance is void and demands a refund of 
impact fees paid to West Jordan. (R. 2-3, Civil Nos. 
870907679, 870907680, 870907681, 870907602, 880904700.) 
The cases were consolidated into this one action by 
an order of the court on August 26, 1988. (R. 20-22.) 
West Jordan moved for partial summary judgment 
claiming that the plaintiffs' complaints were barred by Utah 
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Code Ann. § 10-7-77 which required a notice of claim; as well 
as three statutes of limitations: Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-78, 63-
3-13 and 63-30-15. (R. 127-128, 130-141.) 
The subdividers filed a Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment contending that the claims were brought within any 
applicable statute of limitations. (R. 190, 191.) They also 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment contending that West 
Jordan's affirmative defenses, as a matter of law, are without 
merit and that they were entitled to a refund of fees paid to 
West Jordan. (R. 184-184.) 
The trial court denied the subdividers motions and 
entered an order on March 8, 1990, granting West Jordan's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and dismissing the 
subdividers' Complaints. (R. 323, 340-341.) The subdividers 
filed a Notice of Appeal on April 3, 1990. (R. 346-348.) 
IX. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SUBDIVIDERS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO FILE A NOTICE 
OF CLAIM WITH WEST JORDAN BECAUSE THEIR 
CLAIMS ARE EQUITABLE CLAIMS 
When a city collects a fee without authority to do 
so, it has an equitable duty to refund the fee. El Rancho 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Murray City Corp., 565 P.2d 778 (Utah 
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1977). The claim for a refund is an equitable claim not barred 
by the Utah Governmental Immunity Actf nor the notice of claim 
statute. Id. 
In Call III, this Court ruled that West Jordan did 
not have the authority to take the subdividers' money. The 
subdividers brought this action for a refund. Their claims are 
equitable claims not barred by the notice of claim statute. 
POINT II 
THE SUBDIVIDERS COMPLIED WITH ANY STATUTORY 
NOTICE OF CLAIMS REQUIREMENT 
The predecessor to this action was the Call v. West 
Jordan litigation. Call was filed as a class action. The 
subdividers in this case were part of the class. 
Prior to the Call litigation, Robert J. DeBry filed a 
letter of notice of claim on behalf of all subdividers 
including the appellants in this case. A copy of this letter 
is attached in the Appendix. 
The notice of claim is legally sufficient. Scar-
borough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975); 
San Jose v. Superior Court, 525 P.2d 701 (Cal. 1974). 
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POINT III 
NO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARS THE SUBDIVIDERS 
CLAIMS AGAINST THE CITY OF WEST JORDAN 
I n
 Call III, this Court ruled that West Jordan's 
impact fee ordinance was void ab initio. A void legislative 
act is of no effect and may be successfully attacked at any 
time. Swartout v. City of Spokane, 586 P.2d 135 (Wash. App. 
1978). Therefore, no statute of limitations bars an action for 
a refund of a void fee or assessment. Lake Worth Towers v. 
Gerstung, 262 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1972); Ratcliff v. City of Hurst, 
593 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. App. 1980). 
POINT IV 
ANY APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS TOLLED UNTIL 
THIS COURT RULED ON THE MOTION TO CERTIFY THE CALL 
V. WEST JORDAN LITIGATION AS A CLASS ACTION 
The predecessor to this litigaiton is the Call v. 
West Jordan litigation filed as a class action.. The 
subdividers in this litigation were designated as class 
members. 
Inherent in a class action suit is always the 
possibility that after the statute of limitations period in the 
class claims has expired, the class will not be certified. 
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 720 F.Supp. 894 
(D. Utah 1989). The commencing of a class action, such as Call 
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v. West Jordan, tolls any applicable statute of limitaitons as 
to all class members until the issue of class certification is 
reached by the courts. Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 
U.S. 345 (1983); American Pipe and Construction Co. v. Utah, 
414 U.S. 538 (1974); Sinclair, supra. 
The statute of limitations in this case was tolled 
until July 23 or October 29, 1986, the date this Court denied 
class action status to Call v. West Jordan. The claims in this 
action were brought within 12-26 months after this Court's 
decision, well within any statute of limitations that can be 
applied to the subdividers. 
POINT V 
ANY APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS TOLLED 
BY THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE TOLLING 
A statute of limitations is not an absolute bar to a 
claim. To prevent injustice, courts apply the "doctrine of 
equitable tolling." The doctrine is used to toll the statute 
of limitations pending the outcome of a similar or related 
lawsuit. Telegraphers v. Ry Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342 
(1944); Collier v. City of Pasadena, 191 Cal. Rptr. 681 (Cal. 
App. 1983); Burnett v. New York, 380 U.S. 424 (1965). 
The elements required for equitable tolling are: (1) 
timely notice to the defendant in filing the first claim; (2) 
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lack of prejudice to the defendant; and (3) good faith and 
reasonable conduct by the plaintiffs in filing the subsequent 
claims. Collier, supra. All elements exist in this 
litigation. Thus, any applicable statute of limitations was 
tolled until a final decision was issued by this Court in the 
Call v. West Jordan litigation. 
POINT VI 
APPLYING A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS A BAR TO THESE 
SUBDIVIDERS' CLAIMS VIOLATES THEIR RIGHTS OF ACCESS 
TO THE COURTS GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 11 
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
If this Court upholds the lower court's ruling that 
the statute of limitations bars the subdividers' claims, it 
will effectively re-weight the competing interests identified 
in Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) and 
overrule the Berry decision to the extent it applies to class 
actions. Open access to the courts will be meaningless 
whenever a class action lawsuit is filed, the statute of 
limitations expires and class action certification is denied. 
POINT VII 
IF THERE IS A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLICABLE 
TO THE SUBDIVIDERS' CLAIM, IT IS UTAH CODE ANN. 
§78-12-25 (FOUR YEARS) 
The subdividers do not concede that any statute of 
limitations applies to their claims. However, if a statute of 
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limitations does apply, it is clearly Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-
25, four years. Ponderosa One Ltd. Partnership v. Salt Lake 
City Suburban Sanitary District, 738 P.2d 635 (Utah 1987). 
Because the statute of limitations did not begin to 
run until class action status was determined in Call v. West 
Jordan, the subdividers in this action filed their lawsuit well 
within the four year period. 
POINT VIII 
THE SUBDIVIDERS ARE ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT FOR THE 
IMPACT FEES THEY PAID 
There is no dispute that the subdividers paid the 
fees to West Jordan. There is no dispute as to the amount. 
There is no dispute that the West Jordan ordinance was void 
from the beginning. Call III. 
No statute of limitations bars the subdividers' 
claim. The other affirmative defenses raised by West Jordan 
are without legal merit. Further, each affirmative defense was 
raised in the Call v. West Jordan litigation. West Jordan is 
collaterally estopped from litigating the affirmative defenses 
again. 
For these reasons, the subdividers are entitled to 
have a judgment entered for a refund of the fees they paid. 
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X. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SUBDIVIDERS' CLAIMS AGAINST WEST JORDAN 
ARE EQUITABLE CLAIMS UTAH'S GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT IS INAPPLICABLE AND THE SUBDIVIDERS 
NEED NOT FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM 
A. Factual Background. 
In Call III, this Court held that West Jordan's 
impact fee ordinance was void ab initio because the City, when 
it adopted the ordinance, failed to comply with the hearing and 
notice requirements set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-25. 
Call III, at 183. This Court ruled that West Jordan did not 
have the authority to take and keep the subdividers' money, and 
remanded the case to enter a judgment in favor of the two 
subdividers, Call and Jenkins. 
Subsequently, the subdividers in this case filed suit 
against West Jordan. Relying on the Call III ruling, they 
contended that West Jordan had taken their money without 
authority. They asked for a refund. 
West Jordan boldly demanded that the trial court 
dismiss the complaint because "NO NOTICE OF CLAIM FROM THE 
INSTANT PLAINTIFF'S FOR REFUND OF THE MONIES PAID BY THEM, SAID 
REFUND JUSTIFIED BY THE CITY'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO HOLD A PUBLIC 
13 
HEARING, WAS EVEN — EVEN NOW, PRESENTED TO THE CITY." (R. 
134. ) 
West Jordan said that Utah Code Ann. § 63-3-13 and 
Section 10-7-77, as they existed in 1978, required the sub-
dividers to file a notice of claim within 90 days after the 
subdividers paid their money. 
The lower court granted summary judgment against the 
subdividers and ruled: "Plaintiff's failed to file 'notice of 
claim' with the City of West Jordan within 90 days after their 
cause of action arose." (R. 323.) 
B. Legal Analysis. 
Both sections 10-7-77 and 63-3-13 as they existed in 
1975-1978 were a part of the of Governmental Immunity statutory 
scheme. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1; El Rancho Enterprises, Inc. 
v. Murray City Corporation, 565 P.2d 778 (Utah 1977). 
In El Rancho, the plaintiffs, like the subdividers in 
this case, brought suit for a refund of the fees and charges 
collected by a city without authority to do so. In El Rancho, 
the fees were water fees. In this case, the fees are flood 
control and park fees. In El Rancho, the City, as is in this 
case, argued that Section 10-7-77 barred the plaintiff's 
claims because no notice of claim was filed by the plaintiffs. 
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The Utah Supreme Court held that governmental 
immunity and the failure to file a notice of claim were not 
defenses to the plaintiff's claims because the claims were 
based on equitable considerations. Id, 
The court acknowledged that "the common law exception 
to governmental immunity from equitable claims has long been 
recognized in this jurisdiction." Jd. at 779. see, Auerbach 
v. Salt Lake County, 23 Utah 102, 63 P. 907 (1901); Wall v. 
Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 593, 168 P. 766 (1917). 
The court then said the foregoing cases have not been 
eroded by the passage of time or the enactment of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. El Rancho, at 7 80; see also, 
Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983); Greenhalqh v. 
Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975). 
After establishing that equitable claims do not 
require a notice of claim, the Utah Supreme Court defined an 
equitable claim as follows: 
If the city obtain[s] the money of another 
by mistake, or without authority of law, it 
is her duty to refund it — not from any 
contract entered into by her on the 
subject, but from the general obligation to 
do justice which binds all persons whether 
natural or artificial. El Rancho, at 779 
citing Auerbach. (Emphasis added.) 
El Rancho is on all fours with this case. In both 
cases, the plaintiffs seek a refund of a City fee. In both 
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cases, the City lacked authority to collect the fee. In both 
cases, the City argued that because no notice of claim was 
filed the claims must be dismissed. The court in El Rancho 
ruled that the claims are equitable and no notice of claim need 
be filed. This Court should issue an identical ruling. 
POINT II 
THE SUBDIVIDERS COMPLIED WITH ANY STATUTORY 
NOTICE OF CLAIMS REQUIREMENT 
A. Introduction. 
The subdividers do not concede that they are required 
to file a notice of claim with West Jordan, but if they are, 
the record shows that a notice of claim was timely filed on 
their behalf. 
B. Factual Background. 
Prior to commencing the Call v. West Jordan class 
action litigation, Robert J. DeBry sent a letter to the West 
Jordan Mayor and City Council, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-
30-2 et seq. West Jordan acknowledges it received the letter, 
a copy of which is attached in the appendix. 
The letter is addressed to the Mayor and City 
Council. It was sent on behalf of subdividers Call, Jenkins 
and all other similarly situated subdividers. The letter 
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explains that West Jordan's ordinance is illegal and that West 
Jordan cannot require the subdividers to dedicate land or pay 
cash. The letter demands that the land and cash be refunded to 
all the subdividers. Finally, the letter stresses that if the 
land and cash are not returned, a class action on behalf of all 
the subdividers will be filed seeking the return of the land 
and the cash. 
C. Legal Analysis. 
The purpose of a notice of claim is to alert the 
public authority, so that a proper and timely investigation of 
the claim can be made. e.g., Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 
2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972); Sears v. Southworth, 563 P.2d 192 
(Utah 1977). A legally sufficient notice of claim: 
1. is in writing; 
2. contains a statement of facts and describes the 
nature of the claim; 
3. is signed by a claimant or an attorney; 
4. is directed to and delivered to someone author-
ized to respond. 
Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 
1975) . 
The DeBry letter notice of claim meets each of the 
above elements. It is in writing. It contains a statement of 
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the facts upon which the claim is based and describes the 
nature of the claim. It is signed by an attorney and it was 
sent and received by the Mayor and City Council of West Jordan. 
West Jordan grumbles that the notice of claim does 
not list the name of each subdivider. However, when a class 
action lawsuit is contemplated, the notice of claim need not 
identify each member of the class. The California Supreme 
Court, in San Jose v. Superior Court, 525 P.2d 701 (Cal. 1974) 
held that the requirements of the California notice of claim 
statute were met when the notice identified the representative 
plaintiffs and added sufficient information to identify and 
ascertain the class itself. In this case, the notice of claim 
identified representatives of the class, Call and Jenkins, and 
provided sufficient information to identify and ascertain the 
class, i.e., all subdividers who paid impact fees, including 
but not limited to, the subdividers in this action. 
D. Conclusion. 
The appellants need not have filed a notice of claim 
because the claim is not governed by Utah's governmental 
immunity statute. See Point I above; see, Cox v. Utah Mortgage 
& Loan Co., 716 P.2d 783, 85-86 (Utah 1986). 
Nevertheless, DeBry's letter complies with any 
applicable notice of claim statute. It is in writing. It was 
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sent and received. It describes the claim and it sets forth 
what must be done to satisfy the claim. 
POINT III 
NO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARS THE SUBDIVIDERS' 
CLAIMS AGAINST THE CITY OF WEST JORDAN 
In Call III, this court declared the West Jordan 
Subdivision Fee Ordinance as void ab initio. Id. at 186. No 
statute of limitations applies to the challenge of a void 
ordinance or assessment. Lake Worth Towers v. Gerstung, 262 
So.2d 1 (Fla. 1972). 
In Lake Worth Towers, the plaintiff challenged an 
assessment. The defendants raised the Florida six-month 
statute of limitations as a defense. In ruling that no 
statute of limitations was a bar to plaintiff's claim, the 
Florida Supreme Court explained: 
The assessment in the instant case was 
void. There was no statutory authority for 
imposing the challenged full-faced assess-
ment on the [plaintiff] property. 
Because the assessment was illegal and 
void, it was properly challenged, even 
though the statute of limitations had run. 
Id. at 4. 
Similarly, in Ratcliff v. City of Hurst, 593 S.W.2d 
863 (Tex. App. 1980), taxpayers sued the city for reimbursement 
of taxes which, as in this case, prior litigation determined 
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were collected without lawful authority. The city raised the 
statute of limitations defense. The trial court, on the basis 
of the statute of limitations, ruled in favor of the city. On 
appeal, the decision was reversed. The Texas Court of Appeals 
ruled that the taxpayers could proceed with their lawsuit. The 
court said: 
We reverse the trial court. We render 
judgment that no limitation statute is 
proper to be applied and that the 
plaintiffs are severally entitled to 
recover judgment for the entire amount of 
the taxes which they paid. . . . 
Id. at 864. see, Swartout v. City of Spokane, 586 P.2d 135 
(Wash App. 1978). (Generally, a void legislative act is of no 
effect and may be successfully attacked at any time.) 
In summary, West Jordan's ordinance was void from the 
beginning. The ordinance and the illegal assessment may be 
successfully attacked at any time. 
POINT IV 
ANY APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS TOLLED 
UNTIL THIS COURT RULED ON THE MOTION TO CERTIFY 
THE CALL V. WEST JORDAN LITIGATION AS A CLASS ACTION 
A. Introduction. 
The subdividers do not concede that any statute of 
limitaitons bars their claim, but if there is an applicable 
statute of limitations, the statute of limitations is tolled 
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until the issue of class action status was finally resolved in 
the related Call v. West Jordan litigation. 
B. Factual Background. 
The Call v. West Jordan case, the predecessor to 
these actions was filed as a class action on February 7, 1978. 
The designated class was: 
All persons partnerships, businesses and 
corporations which have, or will be 
required, to either dedicate seven percent 
(7%) of the land area of their proposed 
subdivision or the equivalent in cash to 
the defendant in accordance with Ordinance 
No. 33 of West Jordan, Utah and the 
amendment thereto adding Section 9-C-8. 
(R. 212.) 
The subdividers in this litigation were members of 
the Call III class. In Call III, this Court ruled on the 
subdividers' motion to certify the class on July 23, 1986. The 
petition for rehearing was denied on October 29, 1986. The 
Call v. West Jordan litigation was remanded to the trial court 
on November 12, 1986. 
C. Legal Analysis. 
In Call III, this Court in denying class action 
status to the subdividers, ruled that the subdividers who paid 
money to West Jordan would have the opportunity to litigate 
their claims: 
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[W]e are here dealing with a class whose 
members have been identified. They are 
developers engaged in business whose claims 
are not so insubstantial that joinder or 
individual suits would not merit the cost. 
It is unlikely that denial of class action 
status would preclude them fthe subdivi-
des] from pursuing their remedies. . . 
Because of our ruling on the merits of the 
case, there is no possibility of incon-
sistent judgments. (emphasis added.) 
Call III, at 183-4. 
This Court's reasoning in Call III is clearly 
correct. Inherent in a class action suit are always the 
possibilities that after the statutory limitations period on 
the class claims has expired, the class will not be certified 
or some class members will opt out of the class to pursue their 
individual claims. In either event, the class member, whether 
he seeks to enter into the original class action suit or by 
filing a separate action, will seek to do so at a time when he 
is technically barred by a strict application of the statute of 
limitations. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 720 
F.Supp. 894 (D. Utah 1989). 
To avoid such an unequitable result, the United 
States Supreme Court squarely held that the commencement of a 
class action, such as Call III, suspends any applicable statute 
of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who 
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would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue 
as a class action. The statute of limitations is tolled for 
all members of the potential class until the issue of class 
certification is resolved by the courts. Crown Cork & Seal Co. 
v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983); American Pipe and Construction 
Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974); Sinclair, supra. 
In the Crown Cork case, the United States Supreme 
Court explained the rationale for the tolling: 
Limitation periods are intended to put 
defendants on notice of adverse claims and 
to prevent plaintiffs from sleeping in 
their rights. . . . [T]hese ends are met 
when a class action is commenced. Class 
members who do not file suit when the 
class action is pending cannot be accused 
of sleeping in their rights. . . . And a 
class complaint notifies the defendant not 
only of the substantive claims being 
brought against them, but also of the 
number and generic identities of the 
potential plaintiffs who may participate in 
the judgment. 
Id. at 352-53. 
When the trial court's decision on class action 
status is appealed, the statute of limitations does not begin 
to run until a final decision is made by the appellate court. 
West Haven School District v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass, 721 
F.Supp. 1547, 1555 (D. Conn. 1988); see, Byrd v. Travenol 
Laboratories, Inc., 675 F.Supp. 342 (N.D. Miss. 1987); c.f. , 
Barkman v. Wabash Inc., 674 F.Supp. 623 (N.D.111. 1987) 
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(Statute of limitations tolled during pendency of class 
allegations in similar earlier actions in which no class was 
ever actually certified); see, Calderon v. Presidio Valley 
Farmers Association, 863 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1989). 
To rule otherwise would frustrate the primary purpose 
of class action litigation, judicial economy. Crown Cork, 
supra; American Pipe, supra. There would be a multitude of 
suits filed at different times, in different courts, before 
different judges, as each potential class member scrambles to 
protect his individual claim. 
This Court, in Call III, recognized that the statute 
of limitations is tolled until a final decision on class action 
certification is reached. Only by doing so could the court 
rule that: "It is unlikely that denial of class action status 
would preclude them [the subdividers] from pursuing their 
remedies. . . . " (Call III, at 183.) 
In summary, a final decision on class action certifi-
cation was not made until either July 23, 1986, the date of the 
Call III decision, or October 29, 1986, the date the petition 
for rehearing on class certification was denied. Any appli-
cable statute of limitations was tolled until the date of the 
final decision. 
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POINT V 
ANY APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS TOLLED 
BY THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE TOLLING 
The purpose and object of a statute of limitations 
is to allow a defendant to research and discover facts 
relevant to a lawsuit while the facts are relatively fresh. 
e.g. , Collier v. City of Pasadena, 191 Cal. Rptr. 681 (Cal. 
App. 1983). A statute of limitations is not an absolute bar to 
a claim. To prevent injustice, courts apply the "doctrine of 
equitable tolling." The doctrine is used to toll the statute 
of limitations for a plaintiff pending the outcome of a similar 
or related lawsuit. For example, the United States Supreme 
Court in Telegraphers v. Ry Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342 (1944) 
tolled a statute of limitations during the pendency of a leng-
thy administrative proceeding over the same claim for wages. 
Similarly, in Collier, The California Appeals Court 
tolled a six month statute of limitations for filing a 
disability pension claim because other workers had filed claims 
arising out of the same disabling injury. 
The rationale for applying the doctrine of equitable 
tolling is that the legislature "would not wish the plaintiff 
deprived of his access to the courts when no policy underlying 
a statute is served in doing so." Burnett v. New York, 380 
U.S. 424 (1965). 
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Three elements, all of which exist in this case, must 
be present to invite the doctrine of equitable tolling. There 
must be timely notice to the defendant in filing the first 
claim; there must be a lack of prejudice to the defendant in 
gathering evidence to defend against the second claim; and 
there must be good faith and reasonable conduct by the 
plaintiff in filing the subsequent claim. Collier, supra. 
In this case, there is absolutely no question that 
the Call v. West Jordan claim was timely filed. This court 
ruled in favor of Call and directed judgment be entered in 
Call's favor. 
Further, the defendant is not prejudiced by 
litigating the claims. In the Call v. West Jordan litigation, 
West Jordan identified the subdividers and the money and cash 
paid by the subdividers. It knew then and it knows now, the 
facts upon which the subdividers claims are based. Because the 
West Jordan ordinance is void, there is no defense to the 
subdividers' claim. See, Point VIII of this brief. 
Finally, the subdividers in this case acted 
reasonably in bringing their claims. It makes no sense for 
them to file separate lawsuits against West Jordan before a 
final ruling was obtained on the class action issue. After the 
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class action issue was finally resolved, the subdividers 
brought their claims within 12 to 26 months. 
In short, because no public policy is served by 
applying the statute of limitations against these subdividers, 
the doctrine of equitable tolling suspends any applicable 
statute of limitations. 
POINT VI 
APPLYING A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS A BAR TO THESE 
SUBDIVIDED CLAIMS VIOLATES THEIR RIGHTS OF ACCESS 
TO THE COURTS GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 11 
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Limitation periods are intended to put defendants on 
notice of adverse claims and to prevent plaintiffs from 
sleeping on their rights. Crown Cork, supra at 352. However, 
as set forth in Point IV of this brief, tolling the statute of 
limitations pending a decision on class action status on 
related litigation, does not impair those interests. However, 
if this Court were to decline to toll the statute, serious 
competing interests guaranteed by Article I, Section 11 of the 
Utah Constitution would be impaired. 
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution is 
part of the Declaration of Rights contained in Utah's 
Constitution. Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 
1985) . It reads: 
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All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done to him . . . shall have 
remedy by due course of law, . . . 
The clear language of Section 11 guarantees access to 
the courts and a judicial procedure that is based on fairness 
and equality. Berry, at 675. 
In Berry, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the 
interests of a products liability statute of repose were 
outweighed by the protected interests of Article I, Section 11. 
The court struck down the statute of repose as unconsti-
tutional . 
In Berry, the interests of the statute of repose 
were to provide a reasonable time within which actions may be 
commenced while limiting the time to a specific period so that 
insurance premiums can be calculated and to expedite the early 
evaluation and settlement of claims. Berry, at 621. 
The statute of repose interests identified in Berry 
are no different than the interests claimed by West Jordan, 
i.e., there should be a short specific period of time to file 
claims so that potential liability can be limited and so that 
claims may be evaluated by an early date. 
If this Court upholds the lower court's ruling that 
the statute of limitations bars the subdividers' claims, it 
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will effectively re-weigh the competing interests identified in 
Berry, and overrule the Berry decision to the extent it applies 
to class action. Open access to the courts will be meaningless 
whenever a class action lawsuit is filed, the statute of 
limitations expires, and class action certification is denied. 
POINT VII 
IF THERE IS A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLICABLE 
TO THE SUBDIVIDERS' CLAIMS, IT IS UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-12-25 (FOUR YEARS) 
As set forth in Point III of this brief, the 
subdividers do not concede that any statute of limitations 
applies to their claims. However, if a statute of limitations 
does apply, the applicable statute of limitations is clearly 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (four years). 
In Ponderosa One Ltd. Partnership v. Salt Lake City 
Suburban Sanitary District, 738 P.2d 633 (Utah 1987), a 
developer sued the sewer district, a governmental entity, for a 
refund of sewer connection fees. The issue before the Utah 
Supreme Court was which statute of limitations applied. The 
governmental entity like West Jordan argued that the § 7 8-12-
31 a six month statute of limitations, applicable to tax 
refunds, was the correct statute. This court rejected that 
notion and held that sewer connection fees are a charge for the 
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use of the sewer and not a tax. Therefore, the applicable 
statute of limitations is Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25, four 
years. 
In the present litigation and the underlying Call v. 
West Jordan litigation, West Jordan constantly said that the 
collected impact fees are an assessment for parks and flood 
control. There is no distinction between sewer fees and parks 
and flood control fees. Therefore, if any statute of 
limitations applies it is the four year statute set forth in 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25. Because the statute does not begin 
to run until a final decision on class action status is 
entered by the Court, the subdivider' actions are well within 
the four years time period. (See Point IV of this brief.) 
West Jordan also argued to the trial court that the 
one year statute of limitations, set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-30 bars the subdividers' claims. West Jordan's argument 
was not pled as an affirmative defense and is waived. Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(h); Tyqesen v. Magna Water 
Co., 13 Utah 2d 397, 395 P.2d 456 (1962). 
Further, when there is a choice between two statutes 
of limitations, the longer statute is applied by the courts. 
Juab County Dept. of Public Welfare v. Summers, 19 Utah 2d 49, 
426 P.2d 1 (1967). 
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POINT VIII 
THE SUBDIVIDERS ARE ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT 
FOR THE IMPACT FEES THEY PAID 
A. Introduction. 
The subdividers appealed not only the trial court's 
dismissal of their complaint but also the trial court's 
failure to award a refund of the fees they paid under the void 
ordinance. 
In Call III/ this Court ruled that West Jordan's 
impact fee ordinance was void ab initio and remanded the case 
to enter a judgment in favor of subdividers Call and Jenkins. 
Call III at 184. 
The court also denied class action status to the 
Call litigation. However, in so ruling, the Court 
acknowledged: 
Because of our ruling on the merits of the 
case, there is no possibility of incon-
sistent judgments. 
Call at 183. 
In summary, the Call III decision ruled that two 
subdividers were entitled to the return of their money and that 
if other subdividers filed actions, there would be no 
inconsistent judgments, i.e., the subdividers also would be 
entitled to the return of their fees paid under the void 
ordinance. 
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Yet in this litigation, West Jordan, contrary to Call 
III, demanded that the lower court enter a judgment incon-
sistent with the Call III ruling, i.e., no refunds for the 
subdividers. 
The request was made on the basis of the statute of 
limitations and other affirmative defenses pled by West 
Jordan. Points I-VII of this brief address the statute of 
limitations issue. The statute of limitations simply does not 
bar the subdividers' claims. 
Further, because West Jordan's affirmative defenses 
of mistake, estoppel, waiver, laches, and unjust enrichment, as 
a matter of law, are without merit and because West Jordan is 
collaterally estopped from raising the affirmative defenses 
that were disposed of in the Call v. West Jordan litigation, 
the subdividers are entitled to an entry of judgment for the 
fees they paid under a void ordinance. 
B. Factual Background. 
1. In Call III, this court ordered the trial court 
to enter a judgment for the impact fees paid by Call and 
Jenkins because the West Jordan Ordinance was void. 
2. On remand, West Jordan amended its answer to 
include the defenses of mistake, estoppel, waiver, laches, and 
unjust enrichment. 
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3. Subsequently the trial court entered a judgment 
in favor of subdividers Call and Jenkins for a refund of the 
fees paid to West Jordan. 
4. Thereafter, the subdividers in this litigation 
sued West Jordan. They alleged that Call III ruled that the 
impact fee ordiance was void and that they were entitled to a 
refund of the impact fee paid to West Jordan. 
5. There is no issue that the West Jordan Ordinance 
is void. There is no issue that the subdividers paid impact 
fees. There is no issue as to the amount of the fee each 
subdividers paid. 
C. Legal Analysis. 
1. Each Defense Pled by West Jordan Fails as a Matter of 
Law. 
a) Mistake. 
Mistake is not a defense to recovery of money paid to 
a municipality. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in El 
Rancho Enterprises v. Murray City Corp., 565 P.2d 778, 779 
(Utah 1977): 
If the city obtains the money of another by 
mistake, or without authority of law, it is 
her duty to refund it. 
The defense of mistake in a case similar to this one 
was addressed by the Colorado Supreme Court in Peterson v. 
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McNichols, 260 P.2d 938 (Colo. 1953). That case involved the 
recovery of license fees paid under an ordinance later ruled as 
invalid by the Colorado Supreme Court. Addressing the City's 
repayment obligation, the Court stated: 
In conclusion, we emphasize that in private 
business, between individuals, if money is 
paid under a mistake of fact or law, the 
right to the return of such money is no 
where denied. A municipality is not exempt 
from the same rule, and why it should seek 
the application of a different rule is not 
understandable. 
Id. at 941. 
Mistake is no defense to these subdividers' claims 
for a refund. 
b) Estoppel, waiver, and laches. 
The policies underlying the defenses of estoppel, 
waiver and laches are similar. Courts often address them 
together. None is a defense to recovery of payments made under 
a void ordinance. 
1. Estoppel. 
Estoppel applies when one by acts, representations or 
conduct, or by silence when he ought to speak, induces another 
to believe certain facts exist and that other person relies 
thereon to his detriment. Leaver v. Grose, 610 P. 2d 1262 (Utah 
1980). Estoppel is not a defense to the plaintiffs' claims 
here. 
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The Supreme Court of Washington explained in Port of 
Peninsula v. Bendiksen, 429 P.2d 859, 861 (Wash. 1967): 
The doctrine of estoppel generally has no 
application in cases where the assessment 
is wholly or absolutely void;. . .nor will 
the act or conduct of a property owner 
estop him to question the validity of an 
assessment where there is a total lack of 
authority on the part of the municipal 
governing body . . . to levy the assess-
ment. (Citing 63 C.J.S. Municipal 
Corporations § 1462b.) 
Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court in City of 
Treasure Island v. Strong, 215 So.2d 473, 477 (Fla. 1968). 
stated: 
It seems well established that principles 
of estoppel and waiver will not operate to 
bar an attack against irregularities and 
defects which by their nature render 
assessment proceedings void, as opposed to 
voidable. 
These principles were summarized by the Supreme Court 
of Nebraska in Cullingham v. City of Omaha, 10 N.W.2d 615, 618 
(Neb. 1943): 
Where special assessments against 
property to pay the cost of 
paving are void, knowledge of the 
proceedings and of the construc-
tion of the improvement will not 
estop the owner from avoiding 
liability therefore, and they 
[assessments] cannot be enforced 
solely on the ground of the 
benefits of the improvements to 
the owners of abutting lots or 
lands. . . . Delay of effort to 
protect against a void tax or 
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assessment cannot have the effect 
of making vital and valid that 
which had no vitality or validity 
from the beginning. 
Just as in Cullinqham, the West Jordan impact fee 
ordinance was declared void from the beginning. As such, the 
plaintiffs "cannot be estopped from avoiding liability." That's 
a cumbersome way of saying that property owners can avoid 
payment under a void ordinance or, if they have already paid, 
they may have those payments returned to them. Estoppel 
cannot bar such a claim. 
2. Waiver. 
Waiver does not apply to a claim for recovery of 
money paid under a void assessment or fee. This was explained 
by the Ohio Court of Appeals in Parente v. Day, 241 N.E.2d 280, 
283 (Ohio App. 1968): 
If any underlying principle can be said to 
govern the waiver, or the loss by estoppel, 
of the right to object to an assessment for 
a street or sewer improvement, it is that a 
property owner cannot ordinarily waive or 
become estopped to urge the invalidity of 
an assessment which is void . . . the mere 
fact that the property owner failed to 
object to the improvements does not work an 
estoppel. 
Waiver requires the intentional relinquishment of a 
known right. There can be no waiver of a right which a party 
did not know existed (the right of refund of the fee payment 
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here) at the time of the alleged waiver. Curtis Publishing 
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
3. Laches. 
The purpose of laches is to prevent one who has not 
been diligent in asserting a known right from recovery at the 
expense of one who has been prejudiced by the delay. The 
question, however, is not whether laches does or does not bar 
the action. Laches is simply not a defense in situations 
where the assessment was levied without legal authority. 14 
McQuillin Municipal Corporations, § 38.191 (3d ed. 1987). 
Where an assessment is void, the lapse of time cannot give it 
life or validity. Laches does not apply where the city lacks 
jurisdiction to act from the beginning. Cullingham, supra. 
In summary, the affirmative defenses of estoppel, 
waiver and laches are without legal merit and do not bar the 
subdividers' claims. 
c) Unjust enrichment. 
Unjust enrichment is not an affirmative defense. It 
is "the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another or 
the retention of money or property of another against the 
fundamental principles of equity." 66 Am.Jur.2d, Restitution 
and Implied Contracts § 3, at 945 (1973). Unjust enrichment is 
37 
closely connected to restitution and occurs when a person or 
entity "retains money or benefits which in justice and equity 
belong to another." Id. at 945. 
If unjust enrichment is to be raised at all in this 
case, it is to be raised by the subdividers, not West Jordan. 
The subdividers paid a lot of money under a void ordinance. 
This is essentially an action for restitution to the 
plaintiffs of money which should be returned to them. (See 
Point I of this brief.) 
The unjust enrichment "defense" of West Jordan is 
simply another way of raising estoppel, as estoppel was raised 
in Parente v. Day, 241 N.E.2d 280, 284 (Ohio. App. 1968): 
It is also contended . . . that appellants 
are estopped from denying liability because 
their property was benefited by the 
improvement, and because, knowing the work 
was being prosecuted, they should have 
taken action and not waited until the work 
was completed. 
Responding to that argument, the court stated: 
.We do not think the principle of 
estoppel applies in such a case. The 
council having failed to properly levy a 
tax, the appellants [property owners] 
cannot be subjected to the payment of any 
part of the expense. 
Id. at 285. 
In Port of Peninsula v. Bendiksen, 429 P.2d 859 
(Wash. 1967), the Washington Supreme Court addressed unjust 
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enrichment in a case similar to this case. In Bendiksen, the 
City brought an action against waterside property owners to 
recover sums allegedly owed to it based on adopted tariffs. 
These charges were for the use of the tidal basin, waterway, 
dock and trestle. The court held that the assessment was void 
as a levy on property beyond its authority. The City said it 
should still recover on an unjust enrichment theory. This was 
based on the improvements made and the benefit to the property 
owner by the facilities and improvements. The City had spent 
$23,000 on a breakwater and an additional $10,000 on repairs 
and maintenance on the facilities. The Court rejected the 
City's claim to recovery for unjust enrichment. 
We do not agree. We are not convinced that 
the benefit accruing to respondents as a 
result of the establishment of the 
facilities involved in this case is an 
unjust enrichment for which [the City] is 
entitled to compensation from [the property 
owners]. 
Id. at 862. 
2. West Jordan is Collaterally Estopped From Raising the 
Defenses of Mistake, Estoppel, Waiver, Laches and 
Unjust Enrichment. 
West Jordan is prevented, under the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel (also known as issue preclusion) from now 
litigating the defenses of mistake, estoppel, waiver, laches 
and unjust enrichment. 
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The elements of collateral estoppel are: 
a) The issue decided in the prior adjudication must 
be identical to the issue presented in the 
action in question; 
b) A final judgment on the merits; 
c) The party against whom the plea is asserted must 
be in privity with a party in the prior 
adjudication; 
d) The issue in the first case must be fully and 
fairly litigated. 
Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978). 
All elements are satisfied in this case. 
The Utah Supreme Court explains the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel as follows: 
The established rule is that a stranger to 
a judgment may assert a judgment against 
one who actually litigated an issue that 
was necessarily decided by the judgment and 
thereby preclude the relitigation of the 
same issue. Nielson v. Droubay, 652 P.2d 
1293, 1296 (Utah 1982) . 
The form of the Judgment in Call v. West Jordan was 
prepared and submitted by West Jordan. Parties "must see to it 
that claims disclosed by the pleadings, yet intended to be left 
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open and undecided, are excluded from the judgment's binding 
effect." Peacock v. Sundre Township, 372 N.W.2d 877, 879 (N.D. 
1985) • 
A judgment becomes conclusive on the questions and 
facts which were in issue. An adjudication contemplates that 
the claims of all parties have been considered and set at rest. 
North Broward Hospital District v. Finkelstein, 456 So.2d 498, 
499 (Fla. App. 1984). 
Res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to 
"matters within the issues framed by the parties or tendered by 
the pleadings. That is, matters which were distinctly put in 
issue." Sunshine Utilities Equipment, Inc. v. Treasure Coast 
Utilities, 421 So.2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. App. 1982). 
West Jordan is collaterally estopped from reliti-
gating the affirmative defenses of mistake, estoppel, waiver, 
laches and unjust enrichment. Those issues were raised in Call 
v. West Jordan, by West Jordan's specific amended answer. The 
judgment in Call v. West Jordan adjudicated all issues raised 
in the pleadings. West Jordan did not preserve any issues to 
be excluded from the judgment's binding effect. Those 
affirmative defenses should be stricken as a matter of law. 
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XI. 
CONCLUSION 
After this Court in Call v. West Jordan, 727 P. 2d 
180 (Utah 1986) ruled that West Jordan's impact fee was void, 
and that the subdividers must individually proceed on their 
claims, these subdividers filed their claims. In Call III, 
this Court ordered a refund of the fees collected by West 
Jordan without authority. In Call III, this Court ruled there 
was no possibility of subsequent inconsistent judgments to 
subsequent claims. 
No statute of limitations bars the subdividers7 claims 
and even if there is an applicable statute of limitations, it 
was tolled until the Call III decision. 
For these reasons, judgment of the trial court must 
be reversed and the trial court ordered to enter a judgment in 
favor of the subdividers for the amount of the fees they paid 
plus prejudgment interest. 
DATED this <^3 day of July, 1990. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Arnold 
Development, Brighton Builders, 
R & D Engineers & /(m^ rican Tierra 
Corp, 
BERtt1 p. DEBRt 
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I O-1.6-60 JUDICIAL CODE 
In action against contractors for defective tributea the proceeds by a certain date. There-
construction, the six-year limitation period of fore, a cause of action accrued when that date 
Subsection (2) applied rather than the three- passed and the defendant had not sold the 
year limitation of Subsection 78-12-26(1) be- property. Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311 
cause plaintiff asserted liability based entirely (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
on written instruments, including contracts. 
Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Constr. Co., Tolling. 
744 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1987). -Concealment or misleading. 
Running of statute. , *T00J o f concealment or misleading by the 
defendant precludes the defendant, in an ac-
—Settlement agreement. tion under a settlement agreement, from rais-
Under a settlement agreement, the defen- ing the statute of limitations defense. Butcher 
dant was to have sold certain property and dis- v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Limitations of actions applicable under ERISA (29 USCS § 1132(a)), 90 A.L.R. 
to action by trustees of employee benefit plan Fed. 374. 
to enforce delinquent employer contributions 
78-12-25. Within four years. 
Within four years: 
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon 
an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and 
merchandise, and for any article charged on a store account; also on an 
open account for work, labor or sendees rendered, or materials furnished; 
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at 
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last 
payment is received. 
(2) A claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections of 
Chapter 6, Title 25, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the 
time for action to one year, under Section 25-6-10; 
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(1)0)); or 
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1). 
(3) An action for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, tion (2); redesignated former Subsection (2) as 
Supp., 104-12-25; L. 1988, ch. 59, § 14. Subsection (3); and made minor stylistic 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- changes in Subsection (1). 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, inserted Subsec-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS apply the two-year limitations provision of the 
p n . r . California Governmental Claims Act, rather 
Uonfhct of laws.
 t h a n t h i s s e c t i o n > t 0 a complaint alleging in-
Constitutionahty. j u r > T s u s t a i n e ( j in a n emergency landing of a 
Federal civil rights actions. helicopter owned by a California governmental 
Malpractice. entity. Jackett v. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & 
Open account. Power, 771 P.2d 1074 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Other claims for relief. ^ ... .. ,.. 
—Federal claim Constitutionality. 
Q: tej " Subsection (3) does not violate the open 
courts provision of the Utah constitution. 
Conflict of laws. McHenry v. Utah Valley Hosp., 724 F. Supp. 
Trial court properly extended comity so as to 835 (D. Utah 1989). 
Art. I, § 9 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 428 
(a) persons charged with a capital offense 
when there is substantial evidence to support the 
charge; or 
(b) persons charged with a felony while on pro-
bation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting 
trial on a previous felony charge, when there is 
substantial evidence to support the new felony 
charge, or 
(c) persons charged with a crime, as defined by 
statute, when there is substantial evidence to 
support the charge and the court finds by clear 
and convincing evidence that the person would 
constitute a substantial danger to self or any 
other person or to the community or is likely to 
flee the jurisdiction of the court if released on 
bail 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pend-
ing appeal only as prescribed by law. 1989 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel pun-
ishments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines 
shall not be imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual 
punishments be inflicted Persons arrested or impris-
oned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor 
1896 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall re-
main inviolate In courts of general jurisdiction, ex-
cept in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight ju-
rors In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall con-
sist of four jurors In criminal cases the verdict shall 
be unanimous In civil cases three-fourths of the ju-
rors may find a verdict A jury in civil cases shall be 
waived unless demanded 1896 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him m his person, property or reputa-
tion, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay, and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribunal m this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a 
party 1896 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend m person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his 
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been com-
mitted, and the right to appeal in all cases In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judg-
ment, be compelled to advance money or fees to se-
cure the rights herein guaranteed The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself, a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her hus-
band, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense 
1896 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indict-
ment — Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after 
examination and commitment by a magistrate, un-
less the examination be waived by the accused with 
the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or 
without such examination and commitment The for-
mation of the grand jury and the powers and duties 
thereof snail be as prescribed by the Legislature 
1949 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — 
Issuance of warrant . ] 
The right of the people to be secure m their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized 1896 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — 
Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the 
freedom of speech or of the press In all criminal pros-
ecutions for libel the truth may be given m evidence 
to the jury* and if it shall appear to the jury that the 
matter charged as libelous is true, and was published 
with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the part) 
shall be acquitted, and the jury shall have the right 
to determine the law and the fact 1896 
Sec. 16. [No impr isonment for debt — Excep-
tion.] 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in 
cases of absconding debtors 1896 
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting ] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or 
military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the 
free exercise of the right of suffrage Soldiers, in time 
of war, may vote at their post of duty, in or out of the 
State, under regulations to be prescribed by lav 
1896 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Im-
pair ing contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or la* im-
pairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed 
2896 
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in 
levying war against it, or in adhering to its enemies 
or m giving them aid and comfort No person shall be 
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of Uo 
witnesses to the same overt act 1896 
Sec. 20. [Military subord ina te to the civil 
power.] 
The military shall be in strict subordination to the 
civil power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be 
quartered in any house without the consent of the 
owner, nor in time of war except in a manner to be 
prescribed by lav> 1896 
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted shall exist within this 
State 1896 
Sec. 22. [Private p roper ty for public use.] 
Private propertv shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation 1896 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.) 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably am 
franchise, privilege or lmrrmmtv »«~ 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 23 
it is not necessarily a requisite to its termma- adverse claimants. Terry's Sales, Inc. v. 
tion that it decide all of the issues between the Vander Veur, 618 P 2d 29 (Utah 1980). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 45 Am. Jur. 2d Interpleader tion in absence of contract or statute fixing 
§ 29 et seq. amount, 57 A.L.R 3d 475. 
C.J.S. — 48 C.J.S. Interpleader § 11. Key Numbers. — Interpleader «=> 14. 
A.L.R. — Amount of attorney's compensa-
Rule 23. Class actions. 
(a) Prerequisites to a class action. One or more members of a class may 
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is 
so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are ques-
tions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) 
the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of 
the class. 
(b) Class actions maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class 
action if the prerequisites of Subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: 
(1) The prosecution of separate actions by or against individual mem-
bers of the class would create a risk of: 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individ-
ual members of the class which would establish incompatible stan-
dards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class 
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of 
the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially 
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or 
(2) The party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds 
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final in-
junctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class 
as a whole; or 
(3) The court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the 
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only indi-
vidual members, and that a class action is superior to other available 
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The 
matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of 
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate 
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the contro-
versy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the 
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims 
in the particular forum; CD) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the 
management of a class action. 
(c) Determination by order whether class action to be maintained; 
notice; judgment; actions conducted partially as class actions. 
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought 
as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be 
maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may 
be altered or amended before the decision on the merits. 
Rule 23 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
(2) In any class action maintained under Subdivision (b)(3), the court 
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under 
the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be 
identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member 
that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a 
specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all 
members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not 
request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his 
counsel. 
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under Sub-
division (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include 
and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The 
judgment in an action maintained as a class acttf5n~lmder Subdivision 
(b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or 
describe those to whom the notice provided in Subdivision (c)(2) was di-
rected, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds 
to be members of the class. 
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a 
class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided 
into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of 
this rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly. 
(d) Orders in conduct of actions. In the conduct of actions to which this 
rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the 
course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or 
complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for 
the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of 
the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to 
some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent 
of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they 
consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims 
or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on 
the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings 
be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent 
persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar 
procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order under Rule 16, 
and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time. 
(e) Dismissal or compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or 
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed 
dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such 
manner as the court directs. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is identical 
to Rule 23, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Advancement, con-
duct, and hearing of actions, orders for, reason-
able notice, Rule 78. 
Antidiscrimination Act, § 34-35-1 et seq. 
Appearance bv attorney, proof of authority, 
§ 78-51-33. 
Capacity to sue or be sued need not be 
averred, Rule 9(a)(1). 
Claims for relief, Rule 8(a). 
Commencement of action, Rule 3. 
Consolidation of actions, Rule 42(a). 
Defenses; form of denials, Rule 8(b). 
Dismissal of actions, Rule 41. 
Fact questions decided by jury, § 78-21-2. 
Form of orders, rules relating to pleadings 
applicable, Rule 7(b)(4). 
Intervention, Rule 24. 
Joinder of claims and remedies, Rule 18. 
Judgment defined, Rule 54(a). 
Jurisdiction and venue unaffected by Rules, 
Rule 82. 
Law questions decided by court, § 78-21-3. 
Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties, Rule 
21. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 23 
Motion to dismiss and notice of motion, 
forms for, Form 20. 
Necessary joinder of parties, Rule 19. 
One farm of action, Rule 2. 
Orders defined, Rule 7(b)(2). 
Orders, enforcement of, by and against non-
parties, Rule 71 A. 
ANALYSIS 
Amendment of rule. 
Notice. 
—Declaratory relief. 
Prerequisites. 
—"Common or general interest." 
—Derivative actions by shareholders. 
—Impracticability of joinder. 
——Size of class. 
—Subdivision developers. 
Cited. 
Amendment of rule. 
Discussion of class actions prior to 1971 
amendment of this rule. See Salt Lake City v. 
Utah Lake Farmers Ass'n, 4 Utah 2d 14, 286 
P.2d 773 (1955). 
Notice. 
—Declaratory relief. 
The provisions of Subdivision (c)(2) concern-
ing notice to the class are applicable only to 
class actions brought under Subdivision (b)(3), 
and not to actions brought, such as for declara-
tory judgment, under Subdivision (b)(2). 
Holmgren v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 582 P.2d 
856 (Utah 1978). 
Prerequisites. 
—"Common or general interest." 
For case discussing requirements of former 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Compro-
mise and Settlement § 11; 24 Am. Jur. 2d Dis-
missal, Discontinuance, and Nonsuit § 15; 56 
Am. Jur. 2d Motions, Rules, and Orders § 29; 
59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties § 47 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders § 51; 
67 C.J.S. Parties § 21 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Attorneys' fees in class actions, 38 
A.L.R.3d 1384. 
Air or water pollution, maintainability in 
state court of class action for relief against, 47 
A.L.R.3d 769. 
Consumer class actions based on fraud or 
misrepresentations, 53 A.L.R.3d 534. 
Appealability of order denying right to pro-
ceed in form of class action — state cases, 54 
A.L.R.3d 595. 
Construction of provision in compromise and 
Orders, modification of, Rule 7(b)(2). 
Orders, services of, Rule 5(a) to (c). 
Permissive joinder of parties, Rule 20. 
Venue of actions, § 78-13-1 et seq. 
statute, see West Point Irrigation Co. v. 
Moroni & Mt. Pleasant Irrigating Ditch Co., 14 
Utah 127, 46 P. 762 (1896). 
—Derivative actions by shareholders. 
Action by corporate shareholders alleging in-
jury to the corporation only, and not to them as 
individuals, was a derivative action and could 
not be brought as a class action. Richardson v. 
Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636 (Utah 1980). 
—Impracticability of joinder. 
Size of class. 
Size of the class is not solely determinative 
of impracticability of joinder. Call v. City of 
West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986). 
—Subdivision developers. 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying class action status to subdivision de-
velopers whose claims were not so insubstan-
tial that joinder or individual suits would not 
merit the cost of challenging an ordinance im-
posing an impact fee as a condition to granting 
plat approval. Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 
P.2d 180 (Utah 1986). 
Cited in Hansen v. Brotherhood of Locomo-
tive Firemen & Enginemen, 24 Utah 2d 30, 
465 P.2d 351 (1970); Olson v. Salt Lake City 
School Dist., 724 P.2d 960 (Utah 1986). 
settlement agreement for payment of costs as 
part of settlement, 71 A.L.R.3d 909. 
Landlord, propriety of dass action in state 
) courts to assert tenants* rights against, 73 
A.L.R.3d 852. 
.; Indenture trustee, propriety of state court 
class action by holders of bonds against, 73 
A.L.R.3d 880. 
Propriety of class action in state courts to 
recover taxes, 10 A.L.R.4th 655. 
Absent or unnamed class members in class 
action in state court as subject to discovery, 28 
>r A.L.R.4th 986. 
Propriety of attorney acting as both counsel 
)  and class member or representative, 37 
A.L.R.4th 751. 
Inverse condemnation state court class ac-
tions, 49 A.L.R.4th 618. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Rule 23.1 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Class actions in state mass tort suits, 53 of Civil Procedure, 85 A.L.R. Fed. 263. 
A.L.R.4th 1220. Key Numbers. — Motions «=* 51; Parties <*=> 
Permissibility of action against a class of de- 9 to 12. 
fendants under Rule 23(b)(2) of Federal Rules 
Rule 23.1. Derivative actions by shareholders. 
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to 
enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the corpo-
ration or association having failed to enforce a right which may properly be 
asserted by it, the complainant shall be verified and shall allege (1) that the 
plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of which 
he complains or that his share or membership thereafter devolved on him by 
operation of law, and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer juris-
diction on a court of the United States which it would not otherwise have. The 
complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the 
plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors or comparable 
authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the rea-
sons for his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. The 
derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does 
not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or mem-
bers similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or association. 
The action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the 
court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to 
shareholders or members in such manner as the court directs. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is identical 
to Rule 23.1, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Corporate stock-
holders or directors, limitation of action 
against, § 78-12-27. 
Corporation defined, Utah Const., Art. XII, 
Sec. 4; § 16-10-2. 
ANALYSIS 
Action barred. 
—Plaintiffs not shareholders at time of wrong-
ful act. 
Class action distinguished. 
Action barred. 
—Plaintiffs not shareholders at time of 
wrongful act. 
Shareholders' action against former corpo-
rate directors and officers for alleged conver-
sion of corporate assets and for breach of fidu-
Extraordinary writs, § 78-35-6 et seq.; Rule 
65B. 
Liability of corporate directors, § 16-10-44. 
Liquidation of corporation, action by or 
against receiver, § 16-10-93. 
Sue and be sued, power of corporation to, 
Utah Const., Art. XII, Sec. 4; § 16-10-4(l)(b). 
ciary duties was barred by this rule where the 
shareholders did not acquire their stock until 
after the events complained of and the shares 
did not devolve on them by operation of law. 
Noland v. Barton, 741 F.2d 315 (10th Cir. 
1984). 
Class action distinguished. 
Action by corporate shareholders which al-
leged injury to the corporation only, and not to 
them as individuals, was a derivative action 
and could not be brought as a class action. 
Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 
636 (Utah 1980). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
^BTia. RATING TO KsicATio/^aprr/^ 
SPAQ! DY SUUOIVIEOS TO IVDLIC JKE D. 
AIDING SKCTICN 9-C-B T1ERIN. 
The City Council of the City of West Jordan ordains as 
follows: 
Section 1. That Ordinance No. 33 of the West Jordan City 
ordinance relating to subdivisions be amended by a/lrllng the 
following section. 
Section 9-C-8 (a). In addition to all the other requirements 
prescribed under this ordinance the subdivider shall be required 
to dedicate seven per cent (7.0%) of the land area of the proposed 
subdivision to the public use for the berveflt and use of the citizens 
of the City of West Jordan and shall convey title of the same to 
the City by a proper conveyance instrument, or in the alterative 
at the option of the governing body of the City, the City may accept 
the equivalent value of the land in cash if it deems advisable. 
Section 9-C-8 (b). The monies received by the City as a result 
of the requirements of Section 9-C-8 (a) hereinabove shall be used by t: 
City for its flood control and/or parks and recreational facilities. 
Section 2. This ordinance shall beccnae effective twenty (20) 
days after its posting in three (3) public places or 30 days after 
publication in a ne^vspaper of general circulation. 
Section S-08 (c). In the event the City governing body elects 
to receive the monies persuant to Section 9-08 (a) said monies shall 
be paid by the subdivider on or before final approval of the plat is 
given by the City Cbuncil. 
PASSED AND ADOPTED this 21st day of January, 1975 by the City 
Council of the City of West Jordan. 1^05 
£01 £78-<^00 
November 3, 1977 
Mayor and City Council 
City of West Jordan 
1850 West 7800 South 
West Jordan, Utah 840 84 
Dear Sirs: 
This office has been contacted by John Call 
and his partner, Clark Jenkins, concerning the Wescall 
subdivision located within the City of West Jordan, Utah. 
TheTwescall SUDQIVISXOST) consists of approximately 30 acres 
in.'.West Jordan legally described as: 
Beginning at a point on the East right-of-
way line of a road which is 33*0 fi S. 89° 
31! 50" E along the section line from the 
S.W. corner of Section 5,'T3S, R1W, S.L.B.&M. 
and running thence N 0° 03f 4 3" W along said 
right-of-wav 169.4 feet, thence S 89° 31f 
50" S 186.35 feet, thence N 4° 11f 20" E 
330.01 feet, thence N 24° 04' 16" E 190.33 
feet, thence N 5° 32! 25" E 487.07 feet, 
thence N 84° 37f 16" E 587.37 feet, thence 
N 0° 28f 10" E 101.81 feet, thence S 89° 
31! 50" E 365.00 feet, thence S 0C 031 43" E 
1320.00 feet, thence N 89° 31' 50" W 1287.00 
feet, to point of beginning. 
Mr. Call and his partner have informed me that 
pursuant to Ordinance No. 33 of West Jordan, Utah, and the 
amendment thereto adding § 9-C-8, they were required on 
July 19, 1977 to pay the amount of $16,576 to the City of 
West Jordan as a condition for approval of the Wescall sub-
division. A copy of the cancelled check is enclosed. Other 
persons subdividing land within the City of West Jordan have 
also been required to dedicate seven percent (7%) of the land 
of the proposed subdivision or pay the equivalent value in 
cash to the City of West Jordan in order to have their sub-
division approved. 
fv/,/.^ _ '-. " 
Mayor and City Council 
City of West Jordan 
November 3, 1977 
Pace Two 
— ... 
After extensive legal research, I have concluded 
that the City of West Jordan cannot legally require subdividers 
to dedicate land or pay cash for public use in the manner 
prescribed by the above ordinance. The ordinance.would appear 
to be invalid as a taking of property for public use. without 
just compensation, or a tax not authorized by the Utah State 
Legislature, or a tax in excess of the maximum tax allowed 
by the Utah State Legislature. 
On behalf of John Call, Clark Jenkins and all. 
others similarly situated who have been required to dedicate 
land or pay cash to the City of West Jordan under the above 
ordinance, I hereby demand that ail such land and/or cash be 
returned. If the land and/or cash is not returned within 
90 days, * pursuant to § 10-7-77, Utah Code Anno., Mr.. Call'and 
Mr. Jenkins have authorized this office to file a class action 
lawsuit for the return of such land and/or cash. 
Sincerely yours, 
Vaiden P. Livingston 
V?L/ehh 
£nc« 
/* * 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone (801) 278-4439 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CALL, an individual, ) 
and CLARK JENKINS, an ) 
individual, on behalf of ) 
themselves and all others ) 
similarly situated, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 
) FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
vs. - ) AND OTHER RELIEF 
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH ) Civil No. 
Defendant. ) 
P l a i n t ! 11 a , Lor tliciuMcl vcti and a l l o t h e i m r m b c i s o f 
the class hereinafter described, allege: 
1 . Th © H A mo A p] AI nl i ffc at© all recinonhc of f- h © 
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah. 
2. The defendant is a city existinq within Salt Lake 
County under the lavs of the State of Utah. 
3. This action is brought against the City of West 
Jordan pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 10-7-77. Plaintiffs request 
that this action for declaratory judgment be advanced on the 
calendar in accordance with Rule 57 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
4 . r 1 a j n I i f f c ' r l a i m , a c nv» r © f u l l y « l o c r r | b©«^ h © r © i n , 
was present «MJ to the (%ity ot Wrst Jordan on Novnml^r 4, 1S77 
in accordance with Utah Code Ann. S 10-7-77 by way of letter 
doted November 3, 3 577. As of the date of this Complaint, the 
City of West Jordan )u:s been in possession of such letter for 
over ninety (90) d.tys and lias refused to allow such claim to 
plaintiffs. 
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 
3. This action is brought by plaintiffs as a class 
action, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others 
Rules of Civil Procedure for damages and miunct* and 
decla ;>ry relief, including costs and c .rneys' fees. 
6. The class so represented by plaintiffs in this 
action, and nr ^ u—^ pip*"f;ffs are themselves members, consists 
of all persons, partnerships, businesses, and corporations which 
have, or will be required, to either dedicate seven percent 
(7%) of the land area of their proposed subdivision or the 
equivalent value in cash to the defendant in accordance with 
Ordinance No. 33 o£ West Jordan, Utah, and the amencment 
:hereto addmq Section 9-C-8. 
7. On infornujtjon and belief, the exact number of 
members of the class identified and described above is not 
Known, but plaint ills believe Lh.it then/ nn* in excess of 
one hundred (100) members. The class is so numerous that 
joinder of individual memners herein is impracticable. 
8. There are common questions of law and fact in the 
action that relate to and affect the rights of each member of 
the class, namely, whether the City of West Jordan can require 
a subdivider of land to dedicate seven percent (7%) of the 
land area of a proposed subdivision or to pay the equivalent 
value m cash to the City of West Jordan to be used for flood 
control and/or recreation and parxs as a condition for obtaining 
the city's approval of the subdivision. 
9. The claims of plaintiffs who are representatives 
of tne class herein are typical of the claims of the class 
in that the claim:; of all membeis of the cl.isr. , including 
plaintiffs, depend on a snowing of the acts and omissions of 
defendant civinc; rise to the riqht of plaintiffs to the relief 
sougnt herein. On information and belief, tnere is no conflict 
as between any individual named plaintiff and other members of 
tne class with respect to this action, or with respect to the 
the class and are acle to, and will, fairly a^d adequately 
protect the - .erests of the class. 
11. This action is properly maintained as a class 
action for the following reasons: 
(a) The prosecution of separate actions by 
individual members of the class would create a risk of varying 
adjudications with respect to individual members of the class 
which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the 
defendant herein, which opposes the class; 
(b) The prosecution of separate actions by 
individual members of the class would create a risk of adjudica-
tions with respect to individual members of the class which would 
as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the 
other members not parties to the adjudications, or would 
substantially impair or impede.their ability to protect their 
interests; 
(c) The defendant herein, which opposes the class, 
has acted or refused to act, as hereinafter more specifically 
alleged, on grounds which are applicable to the class, and has 
by reason of such conduct made appropriate final injunctive 
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the 
entire class as sought in this action; and 
(d) The questions of law and fact common to the 
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting 
only individual members, and a class action is superior to 
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication 
of the controversy. 
COUNT I 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT WEST 
JORDAN ORDINANCE NO. 23 IS INVALID 
12. Plaintiffs hereat reallege paragraphs 1 through 
11 and make them a part hereof. 
; percent (7%) cr the land area of their subdivision* or pay seven 
| percent (7%) or the value of such subdivisions to .,ie City of West 
•J Jordan as a condition for approval of plaintiffs' subdivisions by 
{ such city. The named plaintiffs in this action have paid j| 
•'. approximately Sixteen Thousand Dollars ($16,000.00) which was the 
j; required amount of money to the City of West Jordan. The named 
|! 
J' plaintiffs • subdivision is legally described as: 
ii 
•: Beginning at a point on the East right-of-
3, way hne'of a road which is 33.0 ft S. 89° 
31'50H £ along the section line from the 
S.W. corner of Section 5, T3S, R1W, SLB&M 
and running thence N 0° 03' 43n W alone said 
right-of-way 169.4 feet, thence S 89° 31' 
*j 50" E 186.35 feet, thence N 4° 11' 20* E 
330.01 feet, thence N 24° 04' 16" E 190.33 
fee-, thence N 5? 32' 25" E 487.07 feet, 
thence N 84° 37' 16" E 587.37 feet, thence 
N 0° 28' 10" E 101.81 feet, thence S 89° 
31' 50" E 365.00 feet, thence S 0° 03' 4 3" E 
1320.00 feet, thence N 89° 31' 50" W 1287.00 
feet, to point of beginning. 
14. Section 57-5-3 of the Utah Code Ann. authorizes 
; cities to approve subdivions of land within their bouncaries, 
; but there is no statutory authority for a city to require a 
subdivider to dedicate seven percent (7%) of the land area of 
a proposed subdivision or pay the equivalent value in cash to 
! the city as a condition for the city's approval of such 
i » 
i 
, suocivision. 
15. Plaintiffs request that this court grant 
declaratory judgment in accordance with Utah Code Ann. S^8-33-3 
i* , 
I! ceclarinc that S 9-C-8 of Ordinance No. 33 of West Jordan is 
ii 
i invalid, as the Utah State Legislature has net granted cities 
»• 
ji 
i within the State cf Utah the authority to ozss any such 
il 
|! ordinance. Plaintiffs also recuest that all land dedicated to 
!• the City cf West Jordan and all monies paid pursuant to such 
r 
i; 
1
 ordinance be returned to the respective plaintiffs. 
i: 
ii 
1« 
x6. ?iamti"s hereat reallege paragraphs 1 th.^uch 
15 and make m^ a part hereof. 
17. The defendant has required the named plaintiffs, 
in accordance with Ordinance No. 33 of West Jordan, to pay 
the sum of Sixteen Thousand Dollars (§16,000.00) to the City 
of West Jordan for the public purpose of flood control and/or 
parks and recreation. 
18. Plaintiffs have received no compensation for such 
payment, and the above taking was made without the commencement 
of any action for eminent domain by the City of West Jordan. 
19. Other plaintiffs within the class have been 
required to dedicate land or pay money to the City of West 
Jordan under Ordinance No. 33. No compensation has been 
received by such plaintiffs for the land dedicated or payments 
mace and no actions for eminent domain have been instituted 
by the City of West Jordan. 
20. The actions of the defendant in requiring the 
dedication cf land or payment of money as a condition for 
approval of a subdivision constitute the taking of private 
property for public use without just compensation, in violation 
of tne Utah Const, art. I, S 22, and the U.S. Conut. amenrt. V. 
21. 5y reason cf defendant's unlawful acts, plaintiffs 
have been injured in the amount of the value of the land 
dedicated and money paid. 
COUNT III 
ORDINANCE NO. 3 3 CONSTITUTES 
AN INVALID TAX 
22. Plaintiffs hereat reallege paragraphs 1 through 
21 and make them a part hereof. 
23. Ordinance No. 33 cf West Jordan, Utah, amounts 
to a tax on subdividers and their property by a city. 
24. Under tne Utah Const, art. XIII, S 5, cities and 
^ n < ? ^ 
i • | 
5
 contained v lin SI 0-S-29 of tne Utah Code Ann Such section 
J- does not lis*- subdividers as one of the businesses upon which 
|j cities are authorized to assess and collect a tax, 
f 
I 26. The tax imposed by West Jordan is in violation 
I 
•| of the Utah Constitution and is invalid. The tax, being 
j. seven percent (7%) of the value of the proposed subdivision, 
r 
,' exceeds the maximum tax allowed under Utah law of 25 mils 
II 
; which cities may assess and collect on property under 
i; 
j* S 10-10-57 of the Utah Code Ann. 
;j 27. The City of West Jordan has required plaintiffs 
!' to pay an invalid tax. 
>u 28. Plaintiffs have been damaged by the acts of the 
! defendant complained of herein in the amount of the value of 
j' the land dedicated or money paid to the defendant under 
!i 
if |. Ordinance No. 33. 
jj WHEREFORE/ plaintiffs pray for relief in this action 
i. 
i. 
j; f o r t h e m s e l v e s and a l l o t h e r members of t h e c l a s s as f o l l o w s : 
|l 1. Under Count I for d o c l a r a t o r y iuriqmont: 
it 
• (a) That S 9-C-B of Ordinance No. 33 of t h e 
i! 
jj City of West Jordan be declared and adjudged invalid; 
* (b) That an injunction issue from this court 
t* 
I. enjoining the City of West Jordan from enforcing S 9-C-8 of 
( 
:
 Ordinance No. 33; 
», 
(c) That olaintiffs have judcment aaainst and 
l« 
! receive from the defendant damages in the amount of the value 
j 
;t of all land dedicated and money paid to defendant pursuant to 
§ S-C-3 cf Ordinance No. 33 plus interest at the statutory rate; 
and 
i (d) That the claintiffs receive from the defendants 
I . 
p l a i n t i f f * ' rofit n i n r u r r o d in prn*;ncut i nq t h i s n r i i o n , i n c l u d i n g 
i; 
!! 
•1 
[I 
a -he Court d^ems proper. 
2. Uftwer Count I I for a taking without \ t compemat ion: 
(a) That the a c t s , p rac t i ces and conduct of the 
i 
defendant hereinabove described and complained of in Count I I ' 
be adjudged i n - v i o l a t i o n of the laws of Utah; i 
(b) That an injunct ion issue from t h i s court 
i 
j enjoining the defendant from enforcing S 9-C-8 of Ordinance 
No, 33 of the City of West Jordan; I 
(c) That plaintiffs have judgment against and ; 
receive from defendants damages in the amount of the value 
« 
of all land dedicated and money paid to the defendant under j 
S 9-C-8 of Ordinance No. 33 of the Citv of West Jordan, plus i 
interest at the statutory rate; and ! 
(d) That the plaintiffs receive from the defendant J 
! 
plaintiffs' costs incurred in prosecuting this action, including : a reasonable attorneys1 fee, and such other and further relief 
as the court deems proper. 
DATED this "7 day of February, 19 78. 
VALDEN ?. LIVINGSTON {J 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
Attomevs for Plaintiffs 
2040 East 4800 South, Suite 203 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: 2 7 6-4 4 39 
Plaintiffs' Address: 
505 South Main 
3ountiful, Utah 
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John CALL and Clark Jenkins, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, Utah, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 19186. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 23, 1986. 
Rehearing Denied Oct. 29, 1986. 
Subdividers brought action to chal-
lenge validity of ordinance adopted by city 
which required subdividers to dedicate 7% 
of proposed subdivision land to city or to 
pay equivalent of that value in cash to be 
used for flood control and/or park and 
recreation facilities. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, David K. Winder, 
J., upheld ordinance and subdividers ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, 606 P.2d 217, 
affirmed and remanded. On rehearing, the 
Supreme Court, 614 P.2d 1257, upheld fa-
cial constitutionally of ordinance and re-
manded with instructions. On remand, the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
David B. Dee, J., entered judgment in favor 
of city and subdividers appealed. On ap-
peal, the Supreme Court, Howe, J., held 
that city planning and zoning commission 
failed to comply with statutory require-
ments of public hearing prior to adoption of 
impact fee ordinance where advance notice 
to public was not provided, ordinance being 
considered had not yet been drafted, and 
public did not have opportunity to voice 
their views. 
Remanded with instructions. 
Stewart, J., dissented. 
1. Appeal and Error <s=>1201(3) 
District court did not abuse its discre-
tion in allowing developers to amend com-
plaint after remand, where issues in 
amended complaint were not specifically 
2. Zoning and Planning <£=*134, 135 
City planning and zoning commission 
failed to comply with statutory require-
ments of public hearing prior to adoption of 
impact fee ordinance where advance notice 
of purpose of meeting was not provided to 
public, ordinance in issue had not yet been 
drafted, and public did not have opportuni-
ty to express their views; it was not suffi-
cient that ordinance was adopted at regu-
larly scheduled city council meeting. U.C. 
A.1953, 10-9-1 to 10-9-30. 
3. Parties <£=*9, 11 
District court did not abuse its discre-
tion in denying class action status to devel-
opers challenging impact fee ordinance, 
where proposed class members were identi-
fiable, where each claim would require indi-
vidual consideration by court regardless of 
class status, and where there was no possi-
bility that inconsistent judgments would be 
issued if individual claims were brought. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 23. 
Robert J. Debry, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiffs and appellants. 
Stephen G. Homer, West Jordan City 
Atty., West Jordan, for defendant and re-
spondent. 
HOWE, Justice: 
Plaintiffs, John Call and Clark Jenkins, 
appeal from the trial court's dismissal of 
their complaint and the entry of judgment 
in favor of defendant, City of West Jordan. 
In 1974, West Jordan formulated a plan 
to expand its flood control and public park 
systems to meet the increasing needs of 
the growing city. As part of its plan, West 
Jordan decided to impose an impact fee as 
a condition to granting plat approval to 
subdivision developers. The fee was seven 
percent of the land in the subdivision or, at 
the option of the city, the equivalent value 
in cash. West Jordan, Utah, Ordinance 33, 
§ 9-0-8(2) (1975). Plaintiffs Daid £HP fpp* 
CALL v. CITY OF WEST JORDAN 
Cite as 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986) 
Utah 181 
We have issued two previous opinions in 
this case. In our first opinion, Call v. City 
of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979) 
{Call I), we held that U.C.A., 1953, 
§§ 10-9-1 to -30 empowered West Jordan 
to exact an impact fee to provide for flood 
control and parks as a condition to grant-
ing plat approval. On rehearing, in Call v. 
City of West Jordan, Utah, 614 P.2d 1257 
(1980) (Call II), we upheld the facial consti-
tutionality of the ordinance, but we re-
manded to give plaintiffs an "opportunity 
to present evidence to show that the dedica-
tion required of them had no reasonable 
relationship to the needs for flood control 
or parks and recreation facilities created by 
their subdivision, if any." Id. at 1259. 
[1] On'remand, the trial court allowed 
plaintiffs to amend their complaint to in-
clude a claim that the ordinance was invalid 
because West Jordan had not followed stat-
utory requirements in enacting it. Al-
though West Jordan does not cross-appeal 
the allowance of the amendment, it urges 
this Court to limit the case to the constitu-
tional "reasonableness" issue. However, 
the pleadings may be amended after re-
mand within the sound discretion of the 
trial court so long as they do not cover 
issues specifically foreclosed by the appel-
late court. Street v. Fourth Judicial Dis-
trict Court, Utah County, 113 Utah 60, 
191 P.2d 153 (1948), Utah R.Civ.P. 15; see 
White v. Lobdell, 196 Mont. 156, 638 P.2d 
1057 (1982); Diversified Capitol Corp. v. 
City of North Las Vegas, 95 Nev. 15, 590 
P.2d 146 (1979). The trial court allowed 
West Jordan to argue why the pleadings 
should not be amended; but after consider-
ation, allowed the amendment. Neither 
Call I nor Call II specifically addressed 
this issue, and we find no abuse of discre-
tion in the trial court's allowing the amend-
ment. Therefore, the issue of whether 
West Jordan had followed statutory re-
quirements in enacting the ordinance was 
properly before the trial court. 
Because of problems encountered by the 
plaintiffs in its discovery of information in 
Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899 
(Utah 1981), the trial court issued a pretrial 
order which placed on West Jordan the 
burden of producing evidence on several 
issues. These issues may be condensed 
into two main issues: (1) the reasonable-
ness of the impact fee as applied to plain-
tiffs, and (2) whether the ordinance had 
been adopted according to statutory re-
quirements. 
It is necessary in this opinion to treat 
only the second issue. West Jordan was 
required at the threshold to present prima 
facie evidence that the city had followed 
the statutory requirements contained in 
U.C.A., 1953, §§ 10-9-1 to -30 in enacting 
the ordinance. Within section 25, the legis-
lature has set forth specific procedures 
that a municipality must follow to exercise 
the powers granted to it: 
In exercising the powers granted to it by 
the act, the planning commission shall 
prepare regulations governing the subdi-
vision of land within the municipality. A 
public hearing thereon shall be held by 
the legislative body, after which the leg-
islative body may adopt said regulations 
for the municipality. 
The trial judge held in his conclusions of 
law that the ordinance was validly promul-
gated and that "[i]t was not shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the city 
failed to comply with the provisions of sec-
tion 10-9-25, Utah Code Annotated, in the 
promulgation of the ordinance." This con-
clusion was supported by the court's find-
ing of fact No. 22: 
Prior to the adoption of the Ordinance, 
the governing body of the City conducted 
a public hearing in which an overall mas-
ter plan for the development of the city 
was discussed. This hearing (held in Au-
gust 1974) was conducted in the West 
Jordan school auditorium so as to accom-
modate the large number of citizens in 
attendance. The specific concept of 
flood control and having an impact fee 
paid by new developers was discussed at 
that public hearing. The Ordinance was 
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City Attorney was responsible for the 
selection of the actual language used in 
the text of the Ordinance. The plaintiffs 
submitted no evidence to show that a 
public hearing was not held or that the 
Planning and Zoning Commission did not 
prepare the Ordinance. 
We need not rule on the accuracy of this 
finding to resolve the issues presented in 
this case. Nevertheless, we are free to 
substitute our judgment for that of the 
trial court on the issue of law as to wheth-
er these facts satisfy the requirements of 
section 10-9-25. Olwell i\ Clark, 658 P.2d 
585 (Utah 1982), Automotive Manufactur-
ers Warehouse, Inc. v. Service Auto Parts, 
Inc., 596 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1979). As men-
tioned above, the pretrial order placed upon 
West Jordan the burden of making a prima 
facie showing that it had satisfied the re-
quirements of section 10-9-25. We hold as 
a matter of law that it failed to carry this 
burden. 
Some months prior to the August 1974 
public hearing, the West Jordan Planning 
and Zoning Commission had discussed on 
numerous occasions the idea of requiring 
developers to dedicate a portion of their 
subdivision or to pay an equivalent value in 
cash for parks and flood control. In fact, 
on March 20,1974, the Commission adopted 
a motion to have the city require five per-
cent from subdividers to use for parks. A 
month later, after the Commission had ex-
acted the five percent fee from at least one 
subdivider, the city planner told the Com-
mission that the city had no legal basis to 
impose the fee. During this time, a special 
committee was preparing the West Jordan 
Master Plan. The master plan speaks only 
in general terms about the need for parks 
and recreational facilities. It also address-
es in vague terms who should pay for 
capital improvements to the city, hinting 
that incoming residents should pay more 
than existing residents because "equity in 
community improvements are [sic] seldom 
fairly shared through taxation." Nothing 
in the master plan proposes that developers 
either dedicate seven percent of their subdi-
, r ; ~ ; ~ — — ^ - ' • 
West Jordan asserts, however, that the 
"specific concept of flood control and hav-
ing an impact fee paid by new developers 
was discussed" at the public hearing on the 
master plan. The minutes of the public 
hearing were not introduced as an exhibit, 
nor are they included in the record. How-
ever, one of the witnesses for West Jordan 
testified as to what was in the minutes: 
[Mr. Moosman:] [T]he minutes reflect 
that Mrs. Schmidt asked [the city plan-
ner] concerning what was going on 
with the flood control problems. And 
perhaps I could read that. It would be 
quicker. 
[The Court] . . . Go ahead and read the 
pertinent parts. What does Mrs. 
Schmidt say? 
A. [The witness:] She asked [the city 
planner] to tell what the County Flood 
Control had in mind for developers in 
the— 
Q. Yeah. Go ahead. 
A. [The city planner] then explained 
that each developer must take care of 
his own flood water that originates on 
his property. They have suggested 
catch basins that can be used both for 
flood control and recreational use 
It is to be observed that an impact fee was 
not mentioned. In January 1975, four 
months after the master plan public hear-
ing, the city council enacted the ordinance 
which imposed the seven percent impact 
fee. No evidence of any other public hear-
ing remotely related to the ordinance ap-
pears in the record. 
[2] One's imagination must be 
stretched beyond rational limits to accept 
the master plan public hearing as satisfy-
ing the public hearing requirement of sec-
tion 10-9-25. The ordinance was not even 
drafted until months after the master plan 
public hearing. Section 10-9-25 is very 
clear in this respect. The Commission 
must first prepare the regulations, one of 
which would provide for the impact fee. 
CALL v. CITY OF WEST JORDAN 
Cite as 727 ?2d 180 (Utah 1986) 
Utah 183 
legislative body may adopt said regulations 
for the municipality. In requiring a public 
hearing, our legislature contemplated that 
interested parties would have an opportuni-
ty to give their views, pro and con, regard-
ing a specific legislative proposal, and 
thereby aid the municipal government in 
making its land use decisions. See gener-
ally 1 R. Anderson, American Law of Zon-
ing § 4.11 (2d ed. 1976); 8A E. McQuillin, 
The Law of Municipal Corporations 
§ 25.251 (rev. 3d ed., 1976). 
West Jordan also argues that because 
the ordinance was adopted at a regularly 
scheduled city council meeting which was 
open to the public, the public hearing re-
quirement was satisfied. Although the 
statute does not specifically address the 
required notice, we hold that because the 
statute calls for a public hearing our legis-
lature contemplated something more than a 
regular city council meeting held, so far as 
the record here discloses, without specific 
advance notice to the public that the pro-
posed ordinance would be considered. See 
1 R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning 
§ 4.11 (2d ed. 1976). Notice, to be effec-
tive, must alert the public to the nature and 
scope of the ordinance that is finally 
adopted. Id. at 200. Failure to strictly 
follow the statutory requirements in enact-
ing the ordinance renders it invalid. Mel-
ville v. Salt Lake County, 536 P.2d 133 
(Utah 1975); Anderson at 199. This well 
established rule is followed by the great 
majority of jurisdictions. Annot, 96 A.L. 
R.2d 449 (1964); see Town of Beverly 
Shores Plan Commission v. Enright, 463 
N.E.2d 246 (Ind.1984) (statute required mu-
nicipality to publish two notices in newspa-
per within ten days of hearing—ordinance 
invalidated where first notice appeared in 
newspaper eleven days before hearing); 
Kalakowski v. Clarendon, 139 Vt. 519, 431 
A.2d 478 (1981); Morland Development 
Co. v. Tulsa, 596 P.2d 1255 (Okla.1979) 
(city ordinance establishing flood control 
districts invalidated because of failure to 
follow statutory requirements). We there-
fore hold that the West Jordan, Utah, Ordi-
One further matter must be addressed. 
Plaintiffs urge that we reverse the trial 
judge's findings denying class action status 
to this lawsuit. We will reverse a trial 
court's decision on class action status only * 
when it is shown that the trial court misap-
plied the law or abused its discretion. 
Gold Strike Stamp Co. v. Christensen, 
436 F.2d 791 (10th Cir.1970); 3B J. Moore 
& J. Kennedy, Moore's Federal Practice 
§ 23.97 (2d ed. 1985); 2 H. Newberg, New-
berg on Class Actions § 7.39 (2d ed. 1985). 
In the history of this lawsuit, plaintiffs 
requested class action certification on three 
different occasions from three different tri-
al judges. All three denied their requests. 
Plaintiffs do not assert that the trial court 
misapplied the law in denying class action 
status. Thus, we shall review the trial 
court's decision to determine whether it 
abused its discretion. 
[3] The trial court found that the "puta-
tive class is not so numerous that joinder of 
all parties is impracticable." Plaintiffs as-
sert that the size of the class alone man-
dates that joinder is impracticable. How-
ever, size of the class is not solely determi-
native of impracticability. We acknowl-
edge that there may be instances where 
sheer size alone would determine impracti-
cability. One of the salutary effects of 
Rule 23, Utah R.Civ.P., is that it allows 
access to the courts for numerous claim-
ants to request redness of claims that are 
too small to merit the expenses of litigation 
on an individual basis. 1 H. Newberg, 
Newberg on Class Actions § 3.03 n. 38, 
§ 3.06 at 145 (2d ed. 1985). In other in-
stances, the size and membership of the 
class may be unknown, which makes join-
der impracticable. However, we are here 
dealing with a class whose members have 
been identified. They are developers en-
gaged in business whose claims are not so 
insubstantial that joinder or individual suits 
would not merit the cost. It is unlikely 
that denial of class action status would 
preclude them from pursuing their reme-
dies. See 1 Newbero at 145. Judicial ecnn-
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would still need to be determined on an 
individual basis, regardless of class action 
status. Because of our ruling on the mer-
its of the case, there is no possibility of 
inconsistent judgments and no issue of sub-
stantial public interest remains. Given the 
facts of this case, we cannot hold that the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying 
class action status. 
We remand this case to the trial court to 
enter judgment consistent with this opin-
ion. Costs to plaintiffs. 
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM and ZIM-
MERMAN, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., dissents. 
Gustav E. CLAUS, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Marlise CLAUS, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 20021. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 1, 1986. 
Divorce decree dividing marital proper-
ty was entered by the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, James S. Sawaya, J., and 
husband appealed. The Supreme Court 
held that: (1) division of marital property 
was eminently fair; (2) making Internal 
Revenue Service obligation into husband's 
separate debt was not abuse of discretion; 
and (3) award of temporary alimony to wife 
was not abuse of discretion in view of her 
inability to earn income during parties' sep-
aration. 
1. Divorce <s>252.2, 253(4) 
Division of marital property was emi-
nently fair in awarding approximately 
equal equities despite court not finding val-
ues of parties' premarital assets and in-
crease in those values after date of mar-
riage. 
2. Divorce <e=>252.4 
In dividing marital property, making 
Internal Revenue Service obligation sepa-
rate debt of husband was not abuse of 
discretion in light of joint income tax re-
turns disclosing that wife's income was 
minimal at best. 
3. Divorce <s=>215 
Award of one year of temporary alimo-
ny in amount of $350 per month was not 
abuse of discretion in view of wife's inabili-
ty to maintain real estate license or 
manage parties' rental properties during 
separation due to pendency of divorce. 
J. Richard Bell, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff and appellant. 
George H. Searle, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and respondent. 
PER CURIAM: 
In this divorce action, plaintiff appeals 
from that portion of the decree dealing 
with the distribution of the parties' marital 
estate and the award of temporary alimony 
to defendant. We affirm. 
The parties were married four and one-
half years before they separated. No chil-
dren were born of the marriage. Both had 
been married before and had brought sev-
eral pieces of real property into the mar-
riage. The trial court awarded plaintiff all 
the assets of his two corporations, real 
property owned by those corporations, and 
a rental unit acquired by the parties during 
the marriage. Defendant was awarded the 
home she lived in at the time of the divorce, 
real property the parties had acquired with 
proceeds from her real property holdings, 
and property acquired bv the Darties under 
STEPHEN G HOMER (1536) 
West Jordan Ci ty A t to rney 
P 0 Box 428 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
Telephone 561-1463 
A t to rney f o r Defendant 
MAR 8 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN TIERRA CORPORATION et al, 
Plaintiffs 
vs 
THE CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH, 
Defendant 
ORDER, RULING AND JUDGMENT 
C i v i l No. C 87-7679 
C i v i l No. C 87-7680 
C i v i l No. C 87-7681 
C i v i l No. C 87-7682 
C i v i l No. C 88-4700 
[Cases assigned to Judge Pat B r ian ] 
The C o u r t , h a v i n g read t h e Memoranda o f Law submit ted by Counsel and on 
February 2 1 , 1990, having heard o r a l argument on t h e m a t t e r and b e i n g f u l l y 
a p p r i s e d o f t h e i s s u e s , now e n t e r s t h e f o l l o w i n g F i n d i n g s o f Fac t and 
Conclusions o f Law: 
1 . The ind iv idua l P l a i n t i f f s fa i led to f i l e a "not ice of claim" wi th in 90 
days af ter the i r causes of action arose. 
2. The i n d i v i d u a l P l a i n t i f f s fa i led to f i l e t he i r l i t i g a t i o n wi th in the 
one year "statute of l i m i t a t i o n " period a f ter t h e i r cause of action arose. 
3 . The d o c t r i n e o f " e q u i t a b l e t o l l i n g " has not been adopted by the Sta te 
o f Utah. 
Based upon t h e f o r e g o i n g F i n d i n g s o f Fac t and Conclusions o f Law, IT IS 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1 . Defendant 's Motion f o r P a r t i a l Summary Judgment i s g ran ted . The c la ims 
o f the i n d i v i d u a l P l a i n t i f f s are barred by (1) s t a t u t e s o f l i m i t a t i o n and (2 ) 
the f a i l u r e of the i n d i v i d u a l P l a i n t i f f s to comply with the "not ice of claim11 
s ta tu tes . 
2. P l a i n t i f f s 1 Cross-Mot ion fo r Summary Judgment to s t r i ke Defendant's 
a f f i rmat ive defenses i s denied. 
3. P l a i n t i f f s 1 Cross-Mot ion f o r Summary Judgment to s t r i ke Defendant's 
"s ta tu te of l i m i t a t i o n s " defenses i s denied. 
4 . Counsel f o r t h e Defendant i s d i r e c t e d t o p r e p a r e t h e a p p r o p r i a t e 
w r i t t e n order r e f l e c t i n g t h i s r u l i n g and judgment and s u b m i t t h e same t o t h e 
Court not l a t e r than March 2 , 1990. 
The C l e r k o f t h e C o u r t i s d i r e c t e d t o s t r i k e from the t r i a l calendar the 
th ree -day j u r y t r i a l i n t h i s case, scheduled t o begin on March 2 6 t h . 
Entered t h i s X d a Y of March, 1990. 
PAT B BRIAN 
Judge o f the D i s t r i c t Court 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
GORDON K JENSEN, A t to rney fo r P l a i n t i f f 
MEL S MARTIN, A t to rney fo r P l a i n t i f f 
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o f t h e f o r e g o i n g ORDER, RULING AND JUDGMENT t o Mr Gordon K Jensen, 4252 South 
700 East , Murray, Utah 84107, and t o Mr Mel S M a r t i n , 900 Kenneco t t B u i l d i n g , 
10 East South Temple S t r e e t , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84133 , t h i s 1s t day o f 
March, 1990. 
